Duffing up the Criminal Law? by Tomlin, Patrick
Vol.:(0123456789)
Criminal Law and Philosophy
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-019-09511-x
1 
ORIGINAL PAPER
Duffing Up the Criminal Law?
Patrick Tomlin1
 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
R.A. Duff’s The Realm of the Criminal Law advances the literature on criminaliza-
tion by providing the most thorough exploration and defence yet provided of the 
intuitively attractive idea that criminalization is properly limited to public wrongs 
only. I outline here six concerns I have with the view, as presented in this book, and 
suggest where the account needs further elaboration, defence, or rethinking.
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1 Introduction
I am tremendously honoured to be asked to participate in this symposium on Antony 
Duff’s The Realm of Criminal Law. The international community of criminal law 
theory owes Antony a huge debt. He is not only one of the preeminent scholars in 
this field, he has also done so much to build and shape it as a community. The Realm 
of Criminal Law Theory is a civil order in which Antony has played a leading role. 
And while Antony’s politics are avowedly egalitarian, academic esteem is not, and 
he is surely one of the high priests of that community.
The central idea that The Realm of Criminal Law seeks to explore and defend—
that the proper scope of criminal law is limited to ‘public wrongs’—is a powerful 
and intuitively attractive one. But it is also one that is hard to pin down. The idea, 
attractive as it is, seems to swing between something close to empty, and something 
close to scary. At the empty end, it can feel as if it swings a little too close to ‘we 
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should only criminalize what we ought to criminalize.’ So formal as to be just about 
empty. At the scary end, ‘public wrongs’ seems so permissive as to provide hardly 
any brakes on the criminalization process at all—if we think something is ‘our’ 
business, we can criminalize it. This hardly offers us the principled bulwark against 
overcriminalization that we seek.1
This book develops, explains, argues for, and replies to criticisms of the view in 
ways that renders it much clearer and more convincing than previous iterations. I, 
for one, now have a much better sense of what the view can do, and where it is com-
ing from. But the book is also candid about what the view cannot do. The concept of 
public wrongs is not empty, but it is ‘thin’. It is not a substantive view of criminali-
zation. Rather, it can structure debate about criminalization.
That said, I do, of course, have remaining, and new, worries about the view. In 
this paper, I will seek to explain six concerns I have about the view as presented in 
The Realm of Criminal Law. Briefly, these are as follows:
1. There is an ambiguity in the central principles of criminalization for which Duff 
argues. There are two different interpretations of Duff’s principles of criminaliza-
tion—an ambitious reading and a modest reading. I show that Duff favours the 
ambitious reading.
2. I argue that Duff is wrong to go for the ambitious reading. This leads to an unhelp-
ful structuring of debates around criminalization: criminalization becomes the 
‘default’ response to public wrongs. In order to escape this conclusion, Duff 
would need to admit that his theory is not really a theory of criminalization.
3. Duff’s principles of criminalization as stated give us reason to criminalize minor 
public wrongs, like queue-jumping. His defence of this seems inconsistent with 
his rejection of expansive legal moralism, as defended by Michael Moore.
4. Duff delineates two complaints against criminalization that arise from the public 
wrongs account: that the conduct isn’t wrong, and the conduct isn’t public. I think 
the second complaint is too simply stated. These considerations lead us to two 
interpretations of Duff’s Principle B, based around descriptive and normative 
accounts of what counts as ‘public’.
5. The above interpretive question, about the concept of ‘public’, in turn raises the 
question of what the theory is a theory of: what is unjust criminalization and 
what, normatively, follows from it? Without answering these questions, it is hard 
to evaluate the theory.
6. The concept of ‘public wrongs’ seems to play three distinct roles within the book. 
There is a danger that this renders the argument circular.
2  Duff’s Principles: A Modest and an Ambitious Reading
Duff’s book argues for two principles of criminalization:
1 Douglas N. Husak, Overcriminalization (New York: Oxford University Press), ch. 1.
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A. We have reason to criminalize a type of conduct if, and only if, it consti-
tutes a public wrong.
B. A type of conduct constitutes a public wrong if, and only if, it violates the 
polity’s civil order.2
In order to fully understand these principles, we will need to know more about the 
following: what does ‘criminalizing conduct’ entail?; what is a ‘public wrong’?; and 
what is a polity’s ‘civil order’? I will return to all of these later in this paper, though 
much of Duff’s book is spent investigating and clarifying these issues.
In one sense, Duff’s principles appear to be exhaustive. Principle A is an ‘if and 
only if’ principle—it gives a necessary and sufficient condition for having reason to 
criminalize a type of conduct. And Principle B offers us a necessary and sufficient 
condition of what it is for something to be a public wrong.
But notice that whilst Duff’s principles seem exhaustive in one way, in another 
they are quite modest. They concentrate (through Principle A) on what gives us a 
reason to criminalize. We only have reasons to criminalize public wrongs, but it 
doesn’t follow that Principle A gives us a necessary and sufficient condition for per-
missible criminalization. Once we have a public wrong we know, according to Prin-
ciple A, that we have reason to criminalize. But that doesn’t mean that we must, or 
that it would be good to, or even that it is permissible to, criminalize that public 
wrong.
Principle A, as stated, is open to two alternative readings. I’ll show that Duff 
appears to endorse one, but in the next section I will argue that he ought to endorse 
the other. The two readings emerge because of an ambiguity concerning what Prin-
ciple A is supposed to provide us with: does it only specify what kinds of conduct 
we have reason to criminalize, or does it also concern what reasons we have to crim-
inalize that conduct?
Here are the two alternative readings:
Reading 1 (the modest reading): Principle A specifies what types of conduct 
we have reasons for criminalizing, but not our reasons for criminalization. We 
only have reason to criminalize public wrongs, but that they are public wrongs 
does not necessarily exhaust the reasons we have for criminalizing them.
Reading 2 (the ambitious reading): Principle A specifies not only what kinds 
of conduct we have reason to criminalize, but also our reasons for criminal-
izing them. We only have reason to criminalize public wrongs, and our only 
reason for criminalizing them is that they are public wrongs.
Principle A, read strictly, only implies the modest reading. But Duff makes it clear 
he has the ambitious reading in mind – just after one of the central statements of the 
2 R.A. Duff, The Realm of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). The principles are 
first introduced at p. 232, and repeated several times thereafter.
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principles, he clarifies: ‘the only good reason to criminalize a type of conduct is that 
it constitutes a public wrong.’3
Here is Principle A rewritten to reflect this ambitious reading:
Ambitious A: We have reason to criminalize a type of conduct if, only if, and 
because, it constitutes a public wrong.
Neither Modest A (as I will refer to the original Principle A), nor Ambitious A 
imply that we ought to criminalize all public wrongs. Modest A leaves open the idea 
that we might have reasons other than something being a public wrong to crimi-
nalize some conduct (although those reasons could only apply to public wrongs). 
Ambitious A does not allow for these reasons—there are no reasons to criminalize 
conduct other than that it is a public wrong. But it does allow that there can be coun-
tervailing reasons not to criminalize conduct, even if it is a public wrong.
Duff is clear that we should not criminalize all public wrongs. He states:
To say that something constitutes a public wrong is to say that it is our col-
lective business as a polity: it is something to which we have the standing, 
and might have a responsibility, to respond; and an appropriate response to a 
wrong is to mark it as a wrong and to call its perpetrator to account.
However, this is so far to say only that criminalization is an appropriate 
response to a public wrong, not that it is the appropriate response. We might 
have some reason to criminalize every kind of public wrong, in that crimi-
nalization constitutes one possible response. But it is not the only possible 
response…our question must therefore be not simply whether we have reasons 
to criminalize, as if our choice was between criminalizing and doing nothing, 
but whether we have reason to criminalize rather than responding in some 
other way.4
3  The Ambitious Reading and Criminalization as the Default
Duff’s book is avowedly modest in terms of its concrete proposals. Duff shies away 
from trying to tell us exactly what we should and shouldn’t criminalize, and not only 
because such conversations inevitably involve the kinds of complex empirical inves-
tigations which philosophers are notoriously bad at. What Duff hopes to do, above 
all else, is to structure deliberation about criminalization.5 I want to suggest here 
that Ambitious A unduly limits the kinds of reasons we can offer when considering 
whether or not to criminalize some conduct, and that it places the criminal law in an 
unfortunately prominent position when considering how to respond to certain forms 
of wrongdoing: it becomes the default. Ambitious A therefore unhelpfully distorts 
4 P. 278. Various other potential responses to public wrongs are laid out in ch. 7.
5 P. 53 (and throughout).
3 P. 277. Emphasis in original.
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public discourse on criminalization. This, I think, is an important criticism on the 
theory’s own terms, since one of its primary aims is to structure discourse.
Ambitious A has these three implications. First, any and all ‘public wrongs’ are 
wrongs we have some reason to criminalize. Second, we have no reason to crimi-
nalize anything that isn’t a public wrong. Third (where Ambitious A is distinctive 
from Modest A), the only reason we have to criminalize conduct is that it is a public 
wrong.
Let’s imagine we have found a public wrong. To use an example of Duff’s, imag-
ine we recognise queue-jumping as a public wrong.6 It’s wrong, and it’s wrong in a 
way that violates the civil order. Now, we have to decide how, as a political commu-
nity, to respond to this wrong. Duff offers a huge range of potential responses, rang-
ing from ‘nothing’ through to ‘criminalize’ and ‘criminalize and punish’ (these last 
two are importantly different for Duff). Which option should we go for?
According to Ambitious A, we can only offer reasons against criminalization. 
We cannot offer any reasons for criminalization, for we already have the one and 
only such reason we could have—this is a public wrong. And since we cannot offer 
any reasons for criminalization, conduct that is a public wrong is not only poten-
tially criminalizable, it is presumptively so: we must now offer reasons against its 
criminalization, and if we do not, we must criminalize. Criminalization becomes 
the default option for all public wrongs. This unhelpfully structures public debate 
in favour of criminalization—once we have a public wrong nothing else can be said, 
and so nothing else need be said, in favour of criminalization.
This is a reason in favour of Modest A over Ambitious A. Modest A limits crimi-
nalization to public wrongs only, but it does not claim that some conduct’s public 
wrongfulness is the only reason that can be offered in favour of its criminalization. 
Indeed, on Modest A, we could demand that, once we have established something is 
a public wrong, further reasons must be offered in favour of criminalization: some 
conduct being a public wrong is necessary and sufficient to have reason to criminal-
ize, but it is not sufficient reason to criminalize.
An alternative would be to alter Ambitious A so that was not a principle of crimi-
nalization but rather a principle of public (or perhaps official) response. A conduct’s 
public wrongfulness would then be the only reason that could warrant a public 
response, and criminalization, as a species of such a response, would then be on the 
table. However, further reasons may need to be offered in its favour—we would need 
to argue in favour of criminalization as the appropriate public response, not merely 
assume it is the default response.
This is in fact how Duff sometimes appears to understand Principle A. In his dis-
cussion of queue-jumping, Duff writes:
If queue-jumping is a public wrong, on my account we have reason to ensure 
that it receives an appropriate public response—that those who engage in it 
are suitably (proportionately) held to account for it. Criminalization seems to 
6 Pp. 280–282.
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be one way in which we can provide for such a response: we therefore, we 
could say, have reason to consider criminalizing queue-jumping. However… 
we might indeed say that we have no reason to criminalize queue-jumping.7
This is plausible normatively. But this doesn’t seem plausible as a reading of Prin-
ciple A. It is not, as stated, a principle of public response, or a principle concerning 
what we have reason to consider criminalizing. It is a principle concerning what we 
have reason to criminalize. If queue-jumping is a public wrong, we have good rea-
son to criminalize it. In order to say we have no reason to criminalize queue-jump-
ing, we should change Principle A to be a principle concerning public response. 
We’d have reason to respond to queue-jumping, but we’d then need independent 
principles of criminalization which explain when it would be a good idea to use this 
particular public response.
But if this is the right way to read Duff’s theory, it is, crucially, not a theory of 
criminalization. It is a theory of public response. It’s a theory of what we have rea-
son to consider criminalizing, not a theory of what we have reason to criminalize. 
The Realm of Public Response would have been a better title for the book in that 
case.
4  Reasons to Criminalize Minor Public Wrongs? Duff Versus Moore
Even though Duff sometimes implies that his theory is actually a theory of public 
response, elsewhere he seems to interpret his principles as principles of criminaliza-
tion. In doing so, he admits that we do have reason to criminalize queue-jumping. 
Some may find this concerning, but Duff reminds us that ‘having a reason to do x’ 
does not imply that we ought, all things considered, to do x: Our reason to criminal-
ize queue-jumping is ‘clearly not a good enough reason, or even a strong reason; but 
it is a reason to criminalize.’8 Let’s call this the ‘It’s Just A Reason’ (IJAR) response.
First, note, for reasons articulated above, on Ambitious A we have more than ‘just 
a reason.’ We have the reason to criminalize. It’s a presumptive reason. So it is hard 
to see why it wouldn’t be a strong reason to criminalize (though not strong enough). 
But clearly, according to both Ambitious A and Modest A, it’s a defeasible reason.
I won’t, here, try to evaluate the IJAR response. Perhaps we have reasons to do 
all sorts of weird or clearly wrongful things, and so it’s really no big deal to say we 
‘have a reason’ to criminalize queue-jumping. In which case, the force of Principle 
A is quite weak. On the other hand, it seems odd to say there’s anything to be said in 
favour of criminalizing queue-jumping.
The claim I want to make here is that Duff’s use of the IJAR response seems in 
tension with his arguments against other theories which purport to offer a (or the) 
reason to criminalize, since those arguments appear to reject the IJAR response. 
Consider Duff’s objection to Michael Moore’s expansive legal moralism, which 
8 P. 281.
7 P. 281.
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gives us reason to criminalize all moral wrongdoing, including apparently private 
matters like extra-marital affairs, lying, and so on:
The fact remains…that on Moore’s account we have good reason to criminal-
ize every kind of moral wrongdoing—even if that reason is quite often out-
weighed or defeated by reasons against criminalization: but it does seem very 
odd to say that we have any reason at all to criminalize my betrayal of my part-
ner or my friend—or my failure to buy my round in the pub, which is surely a 
breach of the (modest but still real) obligations that partly define that type of 
social interaction.9
Recall, Duff’s view says we have reason to criminalize queue-jumping. Duff says, 
well yes, but that doesn’t mean we should do it. It’s just a reason. And yet when 
Duff rejects Moore, Duff says the IJAR response won’t do. It’s not enough that we 
won’t end up criminalizing extra-marital affairs, we don’t have any reason at all to 
do so.
The IJAR response seems an equally adequate response for both Duff and for 
Moore, or an equally inadequate one. For it seems just as counter-intuitive to say 
that there’s a reason to criminalize affairs as there is to say there’s a reason to crimi-
nalize queue-jumping. Duff would no doubt emphasise that there’s a sense in which 
queue-jumping is ‘our’ business, whilst affairs are the business of the couple, and 
maybe some close relatives and friends. Perhaps my scepticism is that I don’t buy 
that queue-jumping is a public matter: there’s a practice of queueing, but there’s also 
a practice of marriage and of monogamous relationships. Just because there’s a pub-
licly-recognised practice, it doesn’t make violations of that practice a public matter 
(marriage is also a publicly recognised practice). Jumping the queue may only be the 
business of the people in that particular queue.
This response might be quite friendly to Duff: I just deny either affairs or 
queue-jumping are public matters, so of course I wouldn’t see any difference 
between offering a reason to criminalize either. And Duff, of course, recognises 
that there’s plenty of room for reasonable disagreement on what is and isn’t a 
‘public wrong.’ So this would just challenge one particular categorisation of 
something as ‘public.’
But I wonder if there’s a deeper problem here. Duff draws one big line between 
what is ‘our’ business as citizens, and what is not. Public wrongs are our business, 
and so are potentially criminalizable, and there is reason to criminalize them. Affairs 
are not our business, and so it seems wrong to say that they are even potentially 
criminalizable, or that there is any reason to criminalize them. Within the poten-
tially criminalizable, we might make further distinctions around what should be han-
dled by the criminal law, what should be handled by public disapproval, and so on. 
But Duff seems to view these lines as much lighter lines, compared to the big red 
one between ‘public’ and ‘private.’ Once we know we’re in the business of public 
wrongs, we have some choices to make, but the main thing to establish is whether or 
9 P. 74.
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not something is a public wrong. (After all, that’s the only reason that can be offered 
for criminalization).
Yet I would argue that these lines, those within the public sphere, are just as 
important to us. In particular, the line between civil society and government is 
important. There is wrongdoing that can be in the public interest in some sense, 
but it can still be completely inappropriate for governmental or official sanction. 
Consider the ‘private’ wrongdoing of politicians. Sometimes this wrongdoing (as 
wrongdoing) is in the public interest, and so it is held to be, in some sense, ‘our 
business.’ And yet it would be wildly inappropriate for the government or state to 
officially sanction that wrongdoing. Duff’s notion of the ‘public’ sees little differ-
ence between civil society and the government. However, this distinction seems very 
important, such that it seems just as strange to say that there is reason to criminalize 
queue-jumping, even if it is public, as it does to say the same about affairs. Queue-
jumping might be our business, but that doesn’t make it state business, and crime 
needs to be state business.
Maybe it’s fine to say there’s reason to criminalize queue-jumping, even though 
we would never dream of criminalizing it. Maybe it’s just a reason. But I remain 
confused as to why Moore can’t say the same about extra-marital affairs.
5  Not Your Business: Complaints Against Criminalization 
and the Concept of ‘Public’?
Recall Principle A (or Moderate A as I have renamed it):
A. We have reason to criminalize a type of conduct if, and only if, it consti-
tutes a public wrong.
Criminalization that violates Moderate A gives rise to complaints. Duff argues 
we get two distinct, complaints against some conduct having been criminalized, or 
some claim that some conduct ought to be criminalized, from Principle A.10 The first 
complaint is: but that conduct isn’t wrong. For Duff, only wrongful conduct may be 
criminalized. This is what Duff usefully distinguishes as Negative Legal Moralism.
The second complaint is that, even if the conduct is wrongful, it may not be pub-
lic. That is, a citizen might say, ‘Yes! My conduct is wrong. But it’s none of your 
business—it does not concern us as citizens. It does not threaten our civil order.’ 
This notion of what makes conduct public is central to the account, and the book 
does much to define and to help us to understand this notion.
The above discussion about public wrongs that are nevertheless not criminaliz-
able, such as queue-jumping, allow us to add two further complaints about conduct 
that is criminalized. These are related to the ‘that’s not public’ complaint, but are 
distinct from it: they are ‘that’s not the law’s business,’ and ‘that’s not the criminal 
law’s business.’ We can make a complaint that, yes, this is wrong, yes this is a pub-
lic wrong, but, actually, it should not have been criminalized. This could be either 
10 P. 278.
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because it is not the law’s business, or because it’s not the criminal law’s business, 
and should be handled by some other area of law.
The second further complaint is what we can call the ‘wrong civil order’ com-
plaint. This is a version of the ‘not public’ complaint, but it is useful to distinguish 
between two different versions of that complaint. One version is: ‘Hey! Round here 
we don’t take that to be our business!’—that is, the conduct in question does not vio-
late the community’s civil order, as they have constructed it. Call this the Descrip-
tive Version, since the complaint invokes the civil order as we find it. The other is: 
‘Hey! Yes, round here you take that to be your business. But you shouldn’t!’ Call 
this the Normative Version, since the complaint invokes the civil order as it should 
be.
Duff is interested in the civil order both descriptively and normatively.11 Descrip-
tively, the civil order is a rational reconstruction of local political norms and values 
about what is our business. Normatively, the civil order is the civil order we ought 
to have.
There is an important interpretive question here about which of these understand-
ings is relevant in interpreting Principle B, which, recall, defines a ‘public wrong’ as 
conduct that ‘violates a polity’s civil order.’ Is conduct criminalizable because it is 
wrong and is within our local understanding of what is our business; or because it is 
wrong and is within the right, or best, or an acceptable understanding of what is our 
business? Or is only criminalizable if it falls within both?
At one point Duff states that ‘in the end’ his concern is with ‘a normative account 
of the public realm.’12 And Duff does sometimes allow that we might say ‘yes, 
round here this is public, but it shouldn’t be.’13 Duff is clear that people can object 
to a civil order. They can criticise it, and, by extension, criminal laws made off the 
back of it.14 But it’s not clear whether such laws can violate Principles A and B, or 
whether the complaint to be made is of a different nature. If Principles A and B are 
principles of just criminalization, are criminal laws which criminalize wrongs that 
are only public due to a morally deficient civil order unjust laws? Or are they just 
laws that can be criticised on some other basis?
Duff is not only interested in ideal political theory—he also wants to respect 
the communities that have been constructed. He often appears to suggest that what 
makes some conduct properly criminalizable is that it is (a) wrongful; and (b) vio-
lates our civil order (i.e., the descriptive civil order). For instance, he says that 
the liberal republican view he sketches is just an example, not a claim about what 
polities ought to look like.15 He sometimes implies that we ought not to complain 
about local norms around what is public, since what makes them public is context-
driven.16 The civil order is ‘structured by the set of goals and values through which 
11 P. 162.
12 P. 163.
13 See R v. Brown example on p. 162. See p. 166.
14 P. 166.
15 Pp. 5–6.
16 See example of gardens on p. 162, where it would be ‘inappropriate’ when challenged on the state of 
my garden to tell others that it is ‘not their business’ if there was a community norm of taking interest in 
the state of each other’s gardens.
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a polity constitutes itself.’17 Duff wants to allow that we can criticise civil orders, 
but also that there is a modest form of pluralism or relativism built into the public 
wrongs account: ‘By linking criminal law to civil order, and insisting (as democrats 
must) that it is for the polity’s members to work out their conception of their civil 
order, I do open the door to a modest kind of pluralism.’18
Although he claims his interest is ‘in the end’ normative, Duff gives serious 
weight to local positive civil orders. So, it seems, both matter in some way. But, as 
I say, what is not clear is how Principles A and B should be interpreted. Here, then, 
are three different ways of interpreting Duff’s Principles A and B:
Interpretation 1. Normative Only. Principles A and B refer to the best (or 
acceptable) understandings of the civil order. As with wrongs, local beliefs are 
irrelevant.
Interpretation 2. Positive Only. Principles A and B refer to the local, positive 
civil order. There is always good reason to criminalize wrongful conduct that 
violates the civil order we actually have. (However, it is an independent rea-
son against criminalization, that it is not the correct, or is an unacceptable, or 
unreasonable, civil order).
Interpretation 3. Both Positive and Normative. Principles A and B refer to 
both, the local, positive, civil order, and the normative civil order. There is 
only reason to criminalize wrongful conduct if it violates our civil order and 
that civil order is the correct one (or an acceptable one).
Interpretation 1 is not plausible as an interpretation of Duff. However, this reveals 
something interesting. Duff is anti-relativist when it comes to ‘wrongs.’ He deals 
with Devlin’s ‘positive legal moralism’ very quickly. Devlin’s view is that a soci-
ety may criminalize homosexual sex if they think that that’s wrong. But that doesn’t 
matter, says Duff. What matters is whether it is wrong.19 In contrast, when it comes 
to the civil order, Duff is a moderate relativist. It matters what we take to be our 
business, perhaps even if we’re wrong about that. In other words, Duff seems to treat 
moral and political theory differently. Moral demands on individuals are, if not uni-
versal, then certainly cross-polity, and pre-political. What is wrong is not a local 
matter. But demands on polities, on how they treat individuals, are, to some extent at 
least, a local matter. There is only one true morality, but there is reasonable plural-
ism when it comes to constructing the civil order.
Why the double standard? Why can we not plausibly insist that there is just one 
right conception of the civil order (even though there is reasonable disagreement 
about it),20 but we can plausibly insist that there is just one right conception of inter-
personal morality (about which there is reasonable disagreement)? Does a society 
have no ‘right to be wrong’ about individual morality, but a ‘right to be wrong’ 
17 P. 7. My emphasis.
18 P. 232. See also pp. 54, 125.
19 Pp. 53–55.
20 P. 232.
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about political morality? Or is political morality less specific than individual moral-
ity, allowing for greater flexibility? Why should my non-wrongful conduct never be 
justly criminalized, but my incorrectly ‘publicised’ conduct may be?21
The difference between Interpretation 2 and Interpretation 3 comes about when a 
polity has a sub-optimal (or maybe unacceptable) civil order, and so a faulty sense 
of what is its business. It can be criticized. But does it have (defeasible) reasons to 
criminalize wrongful conduct it mistakenly thinks to be its business, or no reason at 
all?
6  What Is This a Theory Of?
Regardless of the interpretive question, if we are attracted to the Public Wrongs 
account, we have to figure out what to say about whether we should endorse Inter-
pretation 2 or Interpretation 3.
In order to do so, I think we need a sense of what would follow, normatively, from 
violating Duff’s principles. Let’s say Duff’s principles are a theory of ‘just criminali-
zation.’ What is at stake here, then, is whether or not a community with a faulty civil 
order creates an unjust law. But in order to know what we think about this, we need 
to know what hangs on whether a law is deemed unjust or not.
If all that follows is that any criminalization that violated these Principles would 
be morally sub-optimal, then there is no reason not to shoot for very demanding 
principles. Go for Interpretation 2. It’s demanding, to be sure, but a theory of mor-
ally perfect law ought to be demanding. Alternatively, if it follows that any such 
law would render any sanction that followed wrongful, we might want to be more 
cautious. Or if it follows that any such law would fail to be duty-generating, this 
might give us reason to be cautious, but in a different way. If you think laws can 
be morally imperfect but still legitimately enforceable, or duty-generating, then it 
matters whether a principle of criminalization is claiming to tell us what ideally we 
should criminalize, which criminal laws are legitimately enforceable, or which crim-
inal laws are duty-generating. But Duff does not really engage with these questions. 
Since we don’t have a sense of what follows from a law being outside the scope of 
Duff’s theory, it is hard to know what the most plausible interpretation is.
To put the point another way, consider various objections to a decision of mine 
(for example, my choosing to spend some money on a sports car rather than give it 
to charity): you have no right—that money isn’t yours to decide what to do with; it’s 
impermissible to use your money in that way; that isn’t the morally best way to use 
your money. These objections are importantly different. The same is true with objec-
tions to criminal law. In objecting to a criminal law, we might be saying to a society 
(or each other), this is morally not a good idea, you have no moral authority to make 
this law, or this is impermissible.
21 I am grateful to Antony Duff and Alec Walen for a fascinating email discussion of these questions, 
and regret that I don’t have space to more fully pursue these issues here.
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
Duff makes it clear that we can object to a civil order, but it isn’t clear what 
(valid) objections of this sort amount to: do they render the laws unjust, illegitimate, 
unenforceable, or what? Relatedly, Duff wants to take account of the importance of 
democratic control in his principles of criminalization, but we can recognise that 
people have rights to control something (their money or their laws) but act imper-
missibly in doing so. We should only take account of democratic control in our prin-
ciples, arguably, if violating the principles meant something like no obligation was 
generated, or we were morally unable to enforce the laws. So without knowing what 
follows from violating the principles, we don’t really know how to interpret them, or 
whether we should agree with them.
7  The Roles of Public Wrongs
One of the principal virtues of The Realm of Criminal Law is it puts far more meat 
on the bones of the idea of a ‘public wrong’ and allows us to see how this idea 
works. There is also, I think, a greater sense of the idea’s limitations—as Duff 
repeatedly acknowledges, it doesn’t tell us much about what to criminalize, but it 
can help structure debate about what to criminalize.
So, we have a better idea about the content (and lack of content) of the idea of 
public wrongs. But here I want to talk about the role of this idea in this book. The 
idea of a public wrong seems to play three distinct roles in the book. One of those 
might give us cause for concern about circularity. The other two may give us cause 
for concern about what, precisely, the argument is for the public wrongs account.
These three roles that the idea of public wrongs plays are as follows. First, public 
wrongs are part of the ‘rational reconstruction’ of the criminal law we actually have. 
Duff states that our theorising about the criminal law must begin with an account of 
the criminal law as it exists. But this is not a purely descriptive task—we must look 
not only at what the criminal law is like, but at the values that it espouses and claims 
to embody. This in turn is not a neutral activity—it is a normatively driven process 
of ‘rational reconstruction.’22 And within the criminal law as we find it, once ration-
ally reconstructed by Duff, we find a criminal law that is not a set of prohibitions, 
but a set of ‘declarative definitions of those ‘public’ wrongs that are to be formally 
marked in this way.’23 So, public wrongs are part of the law as reconstructed—our 
starting point.
The second role that the idea of a public wrong plays is as an account of the 
criminal law that is embedded in, and emerges from, a particular, liberal, republi-
can, account of a polity and its civil order. The proper role for criminal law within 
a polity depends upon how that polity conceives of its civil order, and the role for 
the criminal law within that order.24 Therefore, the public wrongs account is one 
that emerges from a particular civil order: ‘If…we portray criminal law…as an 
22 Pp. 4–6; 12–13.
23 P. 6. See also: pp. 27–28.
24 P. 182.
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institutional practice that functions primarily to define and declare a set of public 
wrongs…we are relying on a particular conception of civil order, as an order that 
requires or marks room for this kind of legal practice.’25 That civil order is the lib-
eral, republican order that Duff describes in chapter 5. That conception of the civil 
order is one which delivers us an understanding of criminal law that is based around 
public wrongs.
The third role that the idea of a public wrong appears to play is as a thin account 
of criminalization into which we can plug just about any account of the civil order. 
The idea of a public wrong here is not necessarily a liberal one, but a liberal civil 
order plus the public wrongs account will deliver us a liberal criminal law. On this 
view, Duff’s account is not in competition with other theories of criminalization—
his purely formal theory is compatible with all of them, and there will be a theory of 
the civil order that justifies all of them.26
The difference between the second and third roles for the idea of public wrongs 
can perhaps be seen by seeing how the two different versions would treat Moorean 
expansive legal moralism.27 According to the second role, in which the pub-
lic wrongs view of criminal law emerges from a liberal account of the civil order, 
expansive legal moralism is in competition with the public wrongs account. Liberals 
would not view their criminal law as appropriately dealing with all wrongdoing, and 
so would reject expansive legal moralism in favour of a public wrongs view of the 
criminal law. Sometimes Duff does indeed present expansive legal moralism as a 
competitor to the public wrongs account.
In contrast, according to the third role, in which the public wrongs account is an 
account into which we can plug different understandings of the civil order, expan-
sive legal moralism is compatible with the public wrongs account, and is an inter-
pretation of it, in a non-liberal setting. Non-liberal societies can say ‘Round here all 
wrongdoing is our business. So all wrongs are public wrongs.’ And that would be 
consistent with Duff’s account.
I want to raise two potential worries here. The first is that Duff’s search for the 
right account of criminalization begins with a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the crimi-
nal law; one that is explicitly not normatively neutral.28 But Duff says fairly little 
about what drives his decisions in interpreting the criminal law. He is up front that 
he is making such decisions, but not about how or why he is making them. Duff also 
says that he is not presupposing that the criminal law is justified—it remains to be 
seen whether the criminal law as described, interpreted, and reconstructed by Duff 
can be justified. However, we may well worry that if we are seeing whether and how 
the criminal law can be justified, and what kind of account of criminalization we 
26 P. 258.
27 M.S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); 
M.S. Moore, ‘Four Reflections on Law and Morality,’ William & Mary Law Review 48 (2007): 1523–
1569.
28 P. 203.
25 P. 183. See also, p. 203, p. 213, and p. 185: ‘whether a polity will have any role at all for a system of 
criminal law, and what that role could be, will depend upon how criminal law is understood, and how the 
polity conceives its civil order’.
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want, and our starting description of the criminal law contains the idea of public 
wrongs, then we only have two choices: endorse a theory of criminalization centred 
around public wrongs; or reject the criminal law altogether.
Presumably, Duff’s defence of this would be that the initial characterisation of the 
criminal law is an initial sketch, and the later development of the view, from within 
the liberal republic civil order fleshes out that view.29 What we get then, is a kind of 
‘reflective equilibrium’—the idea of a criminal law based around ‘public wrongs’ 
is to be found both within the criminal law we have, and proceeds from an abstract 
account of a liberal republic polity.
However, it’s not clear that we have really argued for the public wrongs account 
from either direction. The initial characterisation is a ‘normatively driven’, partial 
account of the criminal law. The liberal republic polity is described, not argued for, 
and it is made clear that it is but one form of civil order we might favour. What 
emerges, I think, is a coherent picture: the idea of a liberal republic produces an 
account of the criminal law which is based around the idea of public wrongs. That 
account is also one of the plausible interpretations we can offer of our own crimi-
nal law. But for those who don’t buy the normatively laden interpretation, or the 
described liberal republic, there’s nothing to offer them as a way into this circle.
The second worry is that it isn’t clear how exactly liberal republicanism and the 
public wrongs account interact, and thus exactly what the argument for the public 
wrongs account is. Here is one version: we start with liberal republicanism, which is 
an attractive account of the civil order; and the best understanding of that civil order 
leads us to a ‘public wrongs’ understanding of the criminal law. Here is another: we 
argue for a ‘public wrongs’ understanding of the criminal law. There are a plurality 
of civil orders compatible with that understanding of the criminal law. Ideally, we 
would plug in a liberal republic account of the civil order, but others are available. 
Crucially, for this version of the argument to go through, the argument for the pub-
lic wrongs account must be independent of the liberal republic account of the civil 
order. Duff, at various times, seem to gesture toward both of these arguments. The 
‘public wrongs’ account seems to emerge from within the liberal republic, but the 
public wrongs account is supposed to be able to be ‘filled in’ with various different 
accounts of the civil order.
8  Conclusion
The Realm of Criminal Law does a lot to dispel previous unclarities about the public 
wrongs account. I now understand the account much better than I did previously. In 
assessing and developing the account further, we need to think about the following.
First, what is the relationship between the appropriate contents of the criminal 
law and our reasons for criminalizing conduct: even if criminalization is limited to 
public wrongs, are they the only reason to criminalize? Are they always a reason to 
29 P. 203: ‘This argument will depend on, but also help to support, the [interpretive] account of criminal 
law I offered in Chapter 1’.
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criminalize? Second, given that not all public wrongs are to be criminalized, what 
kinds of reasons can or should be offered for or against criminalization and other 
forms of public response? These can’t be public wrong-based. Third, what kind of 
account is the public wrongs account? What can be said about, and what follows 
normatively from, laws that violate the account? Is it an account of just laws, mor-
ally ideal laws, legitimate laws, or all of these? Fourth, and relatedly, is the ‘public’ 
in public wrongs normative, descriptive, or both? Fifth, how should we argue for the 
account? Does it proceed from a liberal republican political philosophy, or is that 
just one version of the public wrongs account, which has independent standing?
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